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How U.S. Fails Anti-Communist Liberation Movements

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Sen. Wallop, a former member of the Senate Intelligence Committee, thinks the U.S. is not doing enough for the anti-Communist liberation movements it claims to support. After he delivered the following speech on March 25 before the Monday Club—a weekly gathering of conservatives headed by M. Stanton Evans—the group gave him a standing ovation.

In an article in last summer's *Strategic Review*, I casually mentioned that nearly all people engaged in guerrilla warfare around the world today are fighting not to place the yoke of communism over their necks, but to throw it off.

I described the large-scale fighting in Afghanistan, Angola and Nicaragua, and mentioned that in Mozambique, Ethiopia and throughout Southeast Asia there are significant armed movements as well.

Those observations, it seems, started a new fad. The director of Central Intelligence, in his speeches and submissions to Congress, prominently featured this "new" reality, supposedly peculiar to the 1980s—that is, people who are ruled by Communists dislike it intensely, and fight back as best they can.

Director Casey, of course, is correct to note that this fact offers the United States great opportunities. But the CIA's surprise that most people love freedom enough to fight for it is itself noteworthy. Also, early this year, approving references to the worldwide trend to armed struggle against Communist regimes began to come from the least likely source of all—the U.S. Department of State.

Indeed, last month, before the Commonwealth Club of San Francisco, Secretary of State George Shultz not only gave his blessings to these struggles against communism, but explained our interest in them in a thoroughly compelling way.

Does this mean that this Administration, having discovered the obvious, will follow the obvious consequences of its discovery and actually try to help oppressed people overthrow Communist regimes? I doubt it.

In my view, the Administration's adoption of the theme I first sounded last summer is one more manifestation of a split personality, no less immobilizing to it than the same ailment has been to its predecessors since 1960.

I want to share with you my reflections on the roots of that schizophrenia, and on what we might do about it.

Let me begin with Secretary Shultz's words, because they express my own views so well. His speech in San Francisco was a lucid rejection of the Brezhnev Doctrine.

"The United States," he said, "rejects the contention that once a country has been conquered by a Communist coup, revolution, or invasion its form of government must never again be put in question."

First of all, communism's subjects reject the Brezhnev Doctrine with their lives. They fight. Shultz noted correctly that we Americans are not and cannot be indifferent spectators to such fights.

Like the Founding Fathers, he realizes that we cannot live as free people in this country if the forces of tyranny continue indefinitely to expand and never retreat. He also points out that, nowadays more than ever, the imposition of tyranny, even in faraway places, strengthens the hand of one superpower, the Soviet Union, whose ultimate strategic aim is the destruction of our freedom.

So, according to Shultz, "When the United States supports those resisting totalitarianism... we do so not only out of our historic sympathy for democracy and freedom, but also in many cases in the interests of national security."

Both interest and morality lead us to tell Afghans and Nicaraguans that they have as much right to be free as we do, and that our aid to them will not be a token, but will be effective. He concludes: "Where dictatorships use brute power to oppress their own people and threaten their neighbors, the forces of freedom cannot place their trust in declarations alone." Rise with me and applaud these brave and lucid statements. Bravo.

In practice, however, Secretary Shultz and the department he heads like those before them have accepted the Brezhnev Doctrine without exception. Today, neither the secretary nor anyone in his department say that it is the policy of the United States that this or that country now in Communist hands will be free—ever.

In a vain quest for "stability," the department holds fast to the American counterpart of the Brezhnev Doctrine, enunciated by Henry Kissinger's aide Helmut Sonnenfeldt. According to him, everyone is better off if the Soviet Union enjoys the fruits of empire building undisturbed.

Hence, for example, in Afghanistan,

Secretary Shultz mandated that some \$2 million that the Congress intended be given to the mujahedeen be spent by the International Red Cross in cooperation with the puppet Kabul government. The mujahedeen were to present themselves at a time and place known to their enemies to receive aid intended for them alone.

Thus the department has also opposed giving the Afghans effective air defense weapons, and, along with the CIA, denies what everyone who has been in the Afghan countryside knows: That the Soviets are winning a war of scorched earth, starvation, maiming and disease against the population.

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Finally, the Department of State and the CIA were the only source of opposition to a Joint Resolution that passed overwhelmingly last fall, which pledged the U.S. government to give effective assistance to the mujahedeen, and which stated that it would be wrong to give the freedom fighters enough to fight and die but not enough to win.

I hasten to point out that there was and is no opposition from any sector of American public opinion to helping the mujahedeen reclaim their country from the Soviets. The Congress is pushing in this direction. It has consistently multiplied all of the Administration's requests for aid. But, whether out of belief in the Brezhnev-Sonnenfeldt Doctrine, or out of a pre-emptive, gratuitous assumption that because Congress ultimately would not agree to the measures necessary to defeat the Soviets, the department is disinclined to propose such measures. In fact, the State Department has conceded Afghanistan to the Soviet Union.

The State Department is also trying to foist on southwestern Africa a "solution" that would cut off all aid to Jonas Savimbi's freedom fighters, while leaving 10,000 Cuban troops to protect the Communist regime in Angola. The Cubans would be relieved of the burden of keeping the 25,000 troops in Angola, and the cause of freedom would be sacrificed even as it is on the verge of success.

In Mozambique, the cause of freedom is even closer to triumph. A brutal Communist regime has lost its grip. A solid democratic movement, despite the cutoff of assistance from South Africa, is clearly winning.

What does the State Department propose to do about it? It proposes American military aid for the Communist government. It protests violations of human rights in South Africa, which is the correct thing to do, but in Mozambique it does not protest the concentration camps, the mass murders carried out by the special punitive battalions formed by the North Koreans.

The people of Mozambique and Angola vote with their bodies, and move from under governments that the State Department finds acceptable, to live under a government that the State Department finds unacceptable.

But the State Department's heart is not with their mundane concerns, nor is the State Department's mind amenable to precise calculations of relative good and evil. No, I believe that when Ambassador Andrew Young said that Cuban troops had been good for Africa because they had brought stability, he was speaking the orthodoxy that then ruled, and still rules, our State Department.

Closer to home, it is interesting to hear the secretary today echo the President's words about the Nicaraguan freedom fighters. I cannot help but remember, though, that last October we could in all likelihood have obtained full funding for those freedom fighters simply by refusing to accept a continuing resolution that contained a prohibition against such funding.

George Shultz and his assistant, Langhorne A. Motley, put up no objection. They accepted the continuing resolution without a fight and worked for a treaty—unenforceable except with American troops—that would have traded our acceptance of totalitarianism in Nicaragua for the Sandinistas' acceptance of freedom in neighboring countries.

Again and again the State Department refuses publicly to face the basic questions posed by the struggle in Nicaragua, and indeed by every other armed anti-Communist movement, to wit: Who shall win this war? Which side is the legitimate representative of its country's people?

Is it in the interest of the United States that the Communist government crush the resistance, or that the resistance overthrow the Communist government? But though Secretary Shultz refuses such questions in public, the State Department clearly answers them in practice.

We recognize the Communist government in Managua as the legitimate representative of the Nicaraguan people. We assume that that government sooner or later will crush the resistance, and we try to build good relations be-

tween the Communist government and its neighbors.

I could go on recounting the department's acceptance of the Soviet Union's violation of arms control treaties, and its unwillingness to go back for more of the same; its bombast following the Soviet Union's murder of 269 innocent civilians on an airliner, coupled with an undiminished eagerness for detente. But my point is already clear: the contrast between words and deeds could not be more stark. But why?

We can get some idea from the instances when Secretary Shultz and others like him are forced to face these inconsistencies.

For example, two weeks ago, at a hearing before the Armed Services Committee, my colleague, Sen. Gordon Humphrey (R.-N.H.), asked the secretary pointedly, but politely, why he thinks he can negotiate mutually advantageous agreements with a government whose behavior is indistinguishable from that of Nazi Germany. The answer was, "Come off it, Senator." Those words came with heartfelt contempt.

By asking such questions, Sen. Humphrey, it seems, broke a rule much valued by people in the Establishment — never translate your words into action, and never, never explain your actions in their own terms. Here is why the rule is so cherished.

The American people have shown in an unbroken string of elections that we want our leaders to wholly reject totalitarianism, and to fight for democracy. It is so easy, and so emotionally satisfying, to meet this demand with words. Yet to translate these words into specific action would mean angering many people who just don't see the contrast between freedom and communism as worth the anguish of genuine action.

On the other hand, if one explains any given instance of accommodation in its own terms, as for example, Helmut Sonnenfeldt did in 1976, one is likely to find a Ronald Reagan who will destroy his ability to hold public office. No wonder George Shultz was angry with Sen. Humphrey's request for a straight answer. The world must be depicted as too complex for such things.

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But, in fact, the world's complex details flesh out a simple but deadly struggle. The people of Afghanistan, Angola, Mozambique, Cambodia, Nicaragua, and of the whole Soviet empire do not have the luxury of playing Hamlet. Their struggles are providing us time—time that we can use to provide for our defenses and to help the friends of freedom, or time that we can offer up, in Winston Churchill's words, "for the locusts to eat."

How shall we use this time? Let me offer a few suggestions.

First, if we allow ourselves to be satisfied with words that are obviously contradicted by actions, we will have *earned* the contempt with which Secretary Shultz and the State Department regard us.

The alternative is never to shrink from asking the hard questions, and following them up again, and again, and again. This is not uncivil—quite the contrary. Civility is sustained by the worth of its currency—words. Words are useful insofar as they reflect reality. Hypocrisy is destructive of civility, but a polite insistence that words and deeds match is called sincerity.

We must keep in mind that their hypocrisy is not altogether bad, it is, as St. Thomas said, the debt that vice pays to virtue. That is, regardless of how distasteful the ideas of which President Reagan speaks might be to many Establishment officials, these officials feel obliged to pay them lip service.

Like Sen. Humphrey, we can refuse to let such officials enjoy the luxury of doing and saying contradictory things undisturbed. We can increase the price of the debt that vice is compelled to pay to virtue, and drive these officials, kicking and screaming, to consistency. Some will be driven to do their jobs, others will be driven *out* of their jobs.

Second, we must keep in mind that ours is a democratic government. In his very lucid memoirs, George Kennan dealt succinctly with the responsibility of the Foreign Service to elected officials. The Foreign Service, Kennan said, has no right whatever to circumscribe or in any way to obfuscate fundamental political choices. The argument that the people, and their elected officials, are insufficiently wise or strong to face such choices directly may or may not be valid.

But either way it pales into insignificance before one fact: The American people are entitled to make fundamental choices about who their friends and enemies are, whom and what to fight or not to fight.

We must keep in mind, and instill into the mind of every secretary of state and Foreign Service officer that foreign policy is not exclusively their business, it is above all *our* business.

Hence we demand that the issues be framed in terms of the real choices we face, i.e., shall we recognize the Sandinista regime or the Contras as the legitimate representatives of the Nicaraguan people? Shall we recognize as the legitimate representatives of the Cambodian people the murderous Khmer Rouge, as we now do, or their democratic opponents, or the Vietnamese? Each of these choices has consequences, material and moral, that we must bear.

I do not accept the charge often made in the White House, that the Congress has cut off aid to the Contras, or that the Congress makes it impossible to aid liberation movements. The Congress is always a faithful register of the pressures put upon it.

If I knew nothing about, say, Nicaragua, other than the confused messages about interdiction of arms delivered by some Administration spokesmen on Capitol Hill, and if I noted that in the case of Nicaragua those spokesmen have failed to apply the pressure that they apply when they are serious, and if I realized that the U.S. government still sees fit to honor the Sandinistas with diplomatic recognition, I would then conclude that the U.S. government is endangering the lives of thousands of innocent Nicaraguans to pressure the Sandinistas about matters less than essential.

Would the Congress respond favorably to serious requests for aid to liberation movements? Would it agree to action that fully matched the President's splendid words? We will not know the answers until the Administration proposes actions reasonably calculated to match the President's splendid words. Only when the proposed actions would actually realize the goals expressed can the case be made unremittably clear and the choices become real.

The alternative is to continue to cover the betrayal of allies and the retreat of freedom's front lines with a blanket of forceful rhetoric. But this leads us to suffer the worst consequences of both forcefulness and weakness.

Our words earn us the reputation of a bully, and our actions earn us the reputation of a loser. As Henry Kissinger cynically observed, to be an enemy of the United States may be inconvenient, but to be dependent on the United States is fatal.

So, if the secretary wants to do in Central America and Afghanistan what Jimmy Carter did and in Africa what Andrew Young advocated, it would be better for the United States if his words reflected it. It would be far better, of course, if the secretary fit his department's action to the President's words—and to his own.

If the White House were to become sincere about anti-Communist liberation movements, it might begin by appointing a high-level official, on a level, say, with the President's coordinator for refugee affairs, who would be responsible for recommending to the President what he might do to help such movements.

Of course, this is already the State Department's job, but the State Department shows a positive disinclination to doing it. Such an official ought, for example, point out to the relevant authorities that the U.S. still grants most-favored-nation treatment to the puppet government in Afghanistan, still props up the Nicaraguan economy by importing bananas from it, and props up the Angolan regime by allowing Gulf Oil to operate there.

Of course such an official would ask the President if he really wants to give military aid to the Communist regime in Mozambique. In other words, we can do many things, great and small, to advance the course of freedom in the world if we will but do them.

Will this lead us into wars like Vietnam? Quite the contrary! Neither Nicaraguans, Angolans, Mozambicans or Afghans want or need our troops. They are willing and able to fight and win for themselves. But if they lose, and if the cause of freedom continues to lose, and our enemies move to our borders then, yes, we will have no choice but to fight for ourselves.

The wages of renunciation are seldom peace. Peace, instead, as the Romans taught, is the reward of military preparedness—and the effective support of friends.